Michigan Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 3

1965

Tying Arrangement With Trademark as the Tying Item Is Not a Per
Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws-Susser v. Carvel Corp.
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Tying Arrangement With Trademark as the Tying Item Is Not a Per Se Violation of
the Antitrust Laws-Susser v. Carvel Corp., 63 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1965).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/8

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Tying Arrangement With Trademark as the Tying
Item Is Not a Per Se Violation of the
Antitrust Laws-Susser v. Carvel Corp.
Several independent franchised soft ice-cream outlets brought
suit for treble damages against Carvel Corporation, the franchising
company, alleging that the contract between them constituted an
illegal tying arrangement1 in violation of section 3 of the Clayton
Act2 and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 The contract bound
the dealers to purchase from Carvel-appointed suppliers all commodities sold as part of the retail dairy composite. Plaintiffs stipulated that they would rely on per se violations at trial. The district
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show the alleged violations and, in any case, the defendant had proved its defense that
the arrangements were necessary to protect the integrity of the
product.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. A trademark tie-in, to be
per se illegal, must meet the same tests applied in a patent tie-in situation: there must be both market dominance and the affecting of a
substantial amount of commerce; here, the plaintiffs had failed to
establish either element. One judge dissented in part on the ground
that patents and trademarks are sufficiently similar to justify the
same presumption of existence of sufficient economic power in the
trademark situation as is permitted in the patent setting, leaving
only the requirement of affecting a substantial amount of commerce, which he felt was met here. The dissent also disagreed with
the district court's finding that the defendant had adequately proved
1. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant-supplier contracts were invalid, that the
defendant engaged in a price-fixing scheme, and that the contract constituted an illegal
exclusive dealing franchise. The first two charges were summarily rejected by the
court. The exclusive dealing arrangement was found to be justified by the necessity
of protecting the good will of the trademark.
The possibility of construing the patents and patented articles as part of the tying
item in the principal case will not be considered in this note.
2. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
3. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958). Both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts have been interpreted as prohibiting tying arrangements, with certain
qualifications. The Sherman Act is applicable in all tying-arrangement cases, while the
Clayton Act is restricted to tie-ins relating to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies or other commodities ••••" 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Whether
the court in the principal case included trademarks within the purview of the latter
statute was not stated, but the dissent seemed to assume that the Clayton Act provided
the basis for suit. Principal case at 513. Under the holding in Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. I (1958), the legal difference in statutory categories would
appear to be immaterial, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent therein. Id.
at 13-16 (dissenting opinion).
4. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The district court also
found that a previous contract between the parties was invalid, but this ruling was
not appealed.
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that its arrangement was justified to protect the good will of the
product. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3151 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1964) (No. 355).
A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." 5 These agreements
almost invariably result in a restraint of trade as the buyer is foreclosed from dealing with other potential suppliers of the tied product and those suppliers are denied access to the market. 6 However,
a tying arrangement in itself is not illegal; it becomes a per se violation only when it is demonstrated that the defendant has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to force the sale
of the tied product on the buyer7 and that a not insubstantial
amount of commerce is affected. 8 The courts have always evinced
5. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). The tied item must
be separate and distinct from the tying item. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d
653, 655 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
6. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962): "['I']hey [tying arrangements]
may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substitutes for the tied product, • • •
and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied product to the
consuming market ••••" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949):
Tie-ins "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." See also
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 237 F.2d 459, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1964); Bowman, Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Lockhart & Sacks,
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section J of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 944 (1952); Turner, The
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
7. This requirement is also denominated "market dominance." The burden imposed
on the plaintiff to show this element may be lessened by judicial inference of "sufficient economic power" from other facts such as product uniqueness or consumer appeal.
United States v. Loew's Inc., supra note 6. The majority in Susser utilized the "market
dominance" and "market control" terminology but did not appear to consider the
alternative of inferring economic power from the existence of the trademark. The
court's reliance on Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), to validate
these contracts would appear to be misplaced. In Northern Pacific, the Court held
that from the nature of the commodity involved (land), the requisite economic power
could be presumed under the Sherman Act, previously interpreted to require a more
stringent standard of proof than a proceeding under § 3 of the Clayton Act. It has
been implied that the fact of the tying arrangement by itself is enough to show the
sufficient economic power over the tying item. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra
note 6, at 470; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 945; Turner, supra note 6, at 64.
There are many illustrations of the lack of clarity as t? what is meant b}'. the _term
"market dominance." Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. Umted States, supra, w,_th TnnesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Compare Umted States
v. Loew's Inc., supra note 6, with White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
8. This criterion would seem to be easily satisfied under the dicta in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329-30 (1962), concerning the amount of commerce
that must be shown to be affected in tying arrangements: "Thus, for example, if a
particular vertical arrangement, considered under § 3 [of the Clayton Act], appears
to be a limited term exclusive-dealing contract, the market foreclosure must generally
be significantly greater than if the arrangement is a tying contract •••• :13ecause such
an arrangement [tying] is inherently anticompetitive, we have held that its use by an
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a marked hostility toward tying arrangements, 9 but recent decisions
have cast doubts on the applicability of the per se rule.10 The most
recent Suprem~ Court dictum on the subject, that tie-ins "may fall
in that category [of per se illegality], though not necessarily so,'' 11
sheds little light on the question, and the overall area of the per se
illegality of tying clauses is not well defined.12
It is clear that a tying arrangement wherein the tying item is
patented will be held to be a per se violation of the patent laws
under the doctrine of patent misuse. 13 The antitrust laws have
supplemented the patent misuse doctrine in preventing the patentee
from extending his patent monopoly. 14 The rationale for the strict
application of the antitrust laws in this context is that the crucial
economic power can be presumed when the tying item is patented,
so that only the amount of commerce affected need be demonstrated.15 The Attorney General's Report16 distinguished between
patents involving broad and basic grants to the patentee and those
of a more limited character, recommending that only tie-ins with
established company is likely 'substantially to lessen competition' although only a
relatively small amount of commerce is affected." However, the question of whether
this test was met also caused disagreement in Susser. Principal case at 519 and 514
(dissenting opinion). It is possible that the fulfillment of either of the two requirements will suffice to show illegality. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note 6, at 469.
Both tests are intended to be methods of determining whether the seller has the
power to force the buyer to take the tied product along with the tying product. The
per se rule has evolved in the belief that when a substantial amount of commerce is
involved in the tied product, this power of coercion can be inferred, thereby saving
the litigants and the court the trouble of much unnecessary proof. United States v.
Loew's Inc., supra note 6, at 45 n.4; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 7,
at 5. For an analysis of the function of the per se rule in eliminating superfluous proof,
see Stedman, Tying Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 64 (1964).
9. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International
Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); cases and authorities cited
notes 6-8 supra.
10. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The emerging
business justification defense has further confused the issue. See cases cited in note!
19-25 infra and accompanying text. The courts, when enunciating the per se rule,
almost invariably use some degree of qualifying language. The White Motor decision,
while containing only dicta concerning tie-ins, can be interpreted to be a somewhat
hesitant and unsure return to the "rule of reason." For comparisons of the rule of
reason and per se approaches, see generally Lockhart &: Sacks, supra note 6; Loevinger,
The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964); Paley, Antitrust

Pitfalls in Exclusive Dealing-Recent Developments Under the Sherman, Clayton and
FTC Acts, 37 NoTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1962); Turner, supra note 6; Note, 75 HAR.v.
L. REv. 795 (1962); 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1038 (1963).
11. White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 10, at 262.
12. The semantic and procedural uncertainty surrounding the term "per se violation" is too protracted to be fully treated here. For a partial discussion, see text
accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
13. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Morton Salt Co. v.
Suppiger Co., supra note 13.
15. See United States v. Loew's Inc., supra note 14, at 45.
16. An'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955).
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the former as the tying article be per se illegal and that a broader
economic inquiry be instituted to determine the actual power possessed by the patentee.17 The courts have occasionally mentioned
this distinction18 but have not affirmatively accepted it. Currently,
it appears reasonable to conclude that any patent owner is running
a serious risk of antitrust illegality in addition to patent misuse if he
imposes a tying clause on a licensee, especially if the patent is
an invention for which there is no reasonably interchangeable
alternative.
When the elements of the per se violation of the antitrust laws
have been established, the common trend of judicial antitrust
theory admits no possibility of any defense to the proved per se
offense in either a patent or non-patent tie-in. But lower courts
have taken cognizance of certain situations when the deleterious
effects usually assumed to be inherent in tie-ins are outweighed
by the desirable aspects of that particular tying arrangement.19 This
still limited area of the "business justification" defense consists of
proof that the defendant had an eminently justifiable and compelling reason for imposing the arrangement, namely, protecting
the good will or "integrity" of the product.20 The defense has been
upheld in instances when an infant company was attempting to
enter the market, 21 when the tying product would function correctly
only if used with the tied product,22 and when specifications for the
17. Id. at 238: "[T]he patentee should be permitted to show that in the entire
factual setting • • • the patent does not create the market power requisite to illegality of the tying clause." Professor Handler took cognizance of the congressional
criticism of the patents chapter and defended the tying arrangement procedure.
Handler, An Examination of the Chapter on Patent Antitrust Problems in Attorney
General's Committee Report, I ANTITRUST BuLL. 157, 159-60 (1955). Cf. Wood, Premises
and Scope of the Patent Chapter, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 243 (1955); 24 GEO, WASH, L.
REv. 122, 132 (1955).
18. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 10 n.8 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Proc•
ess Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961);
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
20. For an extensive treatment of the defense, see Comment, Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity of the Product" Defense, 62 MICH. L. R.Ev.
1413 (1964). See generally Note, 3 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL&: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 317
(1962); Note, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 746 (1961); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961); Note, 72 YALE
L.J. 1171 (1963). There seems to be some uncertainty as to whether the proved defense
justifies the otherwise illegal tie-in or whether it renders the tie-in not a violation at all.
Compare Baker v. Simmons Co., supra note 19 and Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39
(7th Cir. 1961), with United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 19 and Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., supra note 19. As there would be no need
for an affirmative defense unless a violation has occurred, the former would appear to
be the better view.
21. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., supra note 19. (But it is not sanctioned
after the company is established in the market.)
22. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
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tied product would be so detailed as to be impracticable or impossible to satisfy by a competitor.23 The Supreme Court, while
never fully defining the circumstances in which this defense is
allowable, has frequently used language permitting the inference
that some tie-ins are excusable,24 but it has also stated that tying arrangements, if in a context of sufficient economic power, are illegal
"'without elaborate inquiry as to ... the business excuse for their
use.' " 25 This latter dictum notwithstanding, it would appear that
recognition of the business justification defense would tend to eliminate much of the hardship that a harsh application of the per se rule
could conceivably engender in the area of tying agreements.
In Susser, the basic issue was whether the per se rule should be
applied to a tie-in utilizing a trademark, rather than a patent, as the
tying item. The emergence of the business justification defense in
patent and other tie-ins might evidence a trend away from the per
se rule and argue against any extension of it into the area of trademark tie-ins. Often when expounding the rule of tie-in per se illegality, the Supreme Court has included patent and copyright examples and, whether intentionally or otherwise, has failed to mention trademark examples.26 The Court has also indicated, in a different antitrust context, that significant differences exist between
patents and trademarks. 27 On the other hand, Mr. Justice Goldberg
broadly stated in United States v. Loew's Inc., 28 that, "Even absent
a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be
inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes.'' 29 Such language would seem to support
an argument that, since some trademarks are unique or highly distinctive in their attributes because they are prominent criteria by
which the consumer measures the desirability of the product, sufficient economic power is inherent in the trademark and the tie-ins
23. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). In Susser, the
majority accepted the findings of the district court that specifications would be impracticable to satisfy by a competitor. But cf. Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203
F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962). The dissent found the evidence on this point to be
unsatisfactory and inconclusive. Principal case at 515 (dissenting opinion).
24. See authorities cited note 20 supra.
25. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962).
26. E.g., id. at 45.
27. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956).
But cf. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 62 (7th ed. 1956).
Some writers believe that antitrust implications are rampant in the trademark context,
as a result of judicial protection. Borchardt, Are Trademarks an Antitrust Problem1,
31 GEo. L.J. 245 (1943); Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEO. L.J.
113 (1944); Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14
LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 323 (1949). Others stress the competitive element and conclude
that trademark protection does not create monopoly problems. Oppenheim, The
Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADE•
MARK REP. 613 (1950); Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 371, 379 (1962).
28. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
29. Id. at 45. (Emphasis added.)
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should be considered per se illegal whenever a substantial amount
of commerce is affected. But generally overlooked in the sparse
literature30 dealing with the problem of the per se rule as applied
to trademark tie-ins is the significance of this aspect of "uniqueness."
A patent is unique or at least novel, by definition, but any quality
of uniqueness or distinctiveness inherent in a trademark is preponderantly derived from its psychic impact on the consumer's
mind.31 Depending on the renown of the mark, this impact could
vary to a great degree, although the generalized argument that the
owner automatically possesses real market power would seem
realistically to have less force than when a patent is the tying item.32
Furthermore, the trademark tying arrangement problem is complicated by the Lanham Act, 33 the federal law governing registration
of trademarks. Under this act, the trademark owner is under a
duty to ensure that the licensee of the mark maintains the quality
standards previously characterizing the product.34 The contention
is thereby raised, as it was in Susser, that because of this duty to
maintain quality standards by controlling the licensee's performance,
the licensor should not be subject to the antitrust laws when they
obstruct compliance with this provision of the Lanham Act. Although the Lanham Act does not purport to deal directly with anticompetitive· effects, it would appear that the argument for an implied partial antitrust exemption neglects to take into account the
purposes and prohibitions of the act. Section 33 (b) (7) 35 specifically allows, as a defense in an infringement action, the fact
that plaintiff violated the antitrust laws. While this section has been
severely criticized as having no bearing on infringement litigation,36
30. For a discussion of trademarks in an antitrust context generally, see Schniderman, Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
248, 259-68 (1949); Timberg, supra note 27; Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 371 (1962);
Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
31. In the principal case, the defendant's testimony tended to establish the substantial monetary value inherent in the Carvel name. For the value of trademarks in
soft ice-cream franchises generally, see Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714
(D. Kan. 1962); Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. McCullough, 133 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Ill. 1955);
Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955). The "source" and
the "guaranty" theories are the two major conflicting rationales of the nature and
function of trademarks. For an exposition and analysis of the comparative effects of
the application of the two theories, see 3 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 976-81 (2d ed. 1950); Timberg, supra note 27.
32. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 949 n.106.
33. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as am.ended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958), as am.ended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (Supp. V, 1964).
34. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d
484 (C.C.P.A. 1948); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. Mass. 1953);
Morse-Starrett Prod. Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Schniderman,
iupra note 30, at 264-67.
35. Section 33(b)(7), 60 Stat. 439 (1946), 15 U .S.C. § lll5(b)(7) (1958).
36. See ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE·MARK MANUAL 294-97 (1947); Rogers, The
Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 173
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the intent of the legislators to ensure that the trademark licensing
provisions would not supersede antitrust proscriptions seems to be
clear.87 Many cases contain generalizations to the effect that the
Lanham Act provisions do not condone antitrust violations.88 Nevertheless, several courts have recently leaned toward the position that
the protection of the owner's good will and the duty of quality control take precedence over violations of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts: 89 the role of the Lanham Act in requiring quality control is,
at least, a relevant consideration in deciding whether per se illegality
is appropriate in this area.
Decisions involving situations somewhat analogous to that in
Susser have reached different results, seemingly because of two
conflicting considerations: the need to alleviate the anticompetitive
effects inherent in tying arrangements on the one hand and sympathy for the trademark licensor's attempt to preserve the good
name of his product and, not incidentally, his financial interest
therein on the other hand. In Baker v. Simmons Co.,40 the court
stated that tying the use by motels and hotels of its sign carrying
both the name of the motel or hotel and the trademark name of
the mattress which it manufactured to the purchase of its mattresses
by the motel or hotel was not an antitrust violation because it was
justified by business reasons. The court in Anchor Serum Co. v.
FTC, 41 a case that involved a franchise arrangement resembling that
(1949); but cf. Ooms & Frost, Incontestability, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 220, 227 (1949).
The ATI'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANrrrRusr REP. 260 (1955) recommended the repeal of
§ 33(b)(7) and the enactment of the following amendment to § 46(a): "The benefit of
incontestability under Section 15 of this Act shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of any Government agency to institute proceedings under the antitrust laws of the
United States against the owner of such registered mark in any case in which the mark
is alleged to have been used or is being used as an instrumentality of violation of the
antitrust laws."
37. See 92 CONG. REc. 7636, 7872-74 (1946) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney). "But
it is of such great importance to the public of the United States that restraints of
trade shall not be permitted, that the Senate insered [sic] this amendment . • • ."
Id. at 7873. See also H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945); S. REP. No.
1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946); Timberg, supra note 27, at 358-60. For the view of
the Department of Justice, see Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-71 (1944).
38. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 46 (7th Cir. 1961).
39. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Baker
v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962). These holdings, however, do not seem
to be within the permissible area contemplated by the Court in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), where it was stipulated that "the only situation,
indeed, in which the protection of good will may necessitate the use of tying clauses
is where specifications for a substitute [for the tied product] would be so detailed that
they could not practicably be supplied." Id. at 306. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1173
(1963). See generally Schniderman, supra note 30; Comment, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 371
(1962).
40. Supra note 39.
41. 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
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in Susser, found an illegal requirements contract42 instead of a tying
arrangement and was vehement in its denunciation of the defendant's coercive use of the "Anchor" tradename. In Denison Mattress
Factory v. Spring-Air Co.,43 the court also found a requirements contract but held that it was justified to protect the mark and indicated
that a tie-in could be used for the same purpose. Switzer Bros. v.
Locklin44 involved materials tied to both trademark and patent
licenses, and the court found this to be a per se violation, citing the
Lanham Act proscriptions.
An analysis of these cases indicates that the conflict between
opposing policy goals has engendered a certain degree of confusion
regarding the term "per se violation" as used in the trademark
tie-in context. In antitrust litigation the term has come to mean
the demonstration by plaintiff of the requisite elements of an
offense that usually involves a particularly pernicious effect on competition.45 The difficulty has arisen when a real and justifiable need
to employ the tie-in is alleged. 46 The courts, when confronted witli
the elements they deem sufficient to establish a per se violation but
having a stronger desire to exonerate the owner who is trying to
protect his interest, indiscriminately consider both evidence proving
the violation and evidence tending to show that the tie-in is justifiable; and, while tacitly admitting that they are allowing a defense
to a "per se" violation, they hold instead that no violation has occurred.47 While this method frequently allows the court to reach a
desirable result in the case before it, the overall consequence has
been to confuse the determination of which issue is being proved
and to mire the proceedings in a welter of statistics, whose evidential
relevance is questionable. An important function of the so-called per
se rule is to exclude the voluminous and often inconclusive proof of
sufficient economic power (market dominance); 48 however, the additional precept that no defense will be heard after the elements of
the violation have been shown does not appear necessarily to follow.
If courts are unwilling to accept the view that trademarks themselves
42. It is frequently difficult to distinguish between tying arrangements, exclusive
dealing arrangements, and requirements contracts. Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 6, at
915, 920 n.23. The determination is essential since the last two categories demand a more
stringent standard of proof to establish a violation. Compare Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), with Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961). Full-line forcing, a type of tie-in, requires the purchaser to handle
the seller's complete line of products. See generally Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line
Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960).
43. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).
44. 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961).
45. See, e.g., authorities cited note 6 supra.
46. For illustrations of the assertion of this defense in its various forms, see the
cases cited notes 40, 41, 43, and 44 supra.
47. See, e.g., cases cited note 19 supra.
48. See cases and authorities cited notes 7-8 supra.
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do not necessarily indicate sufficient economic power, the situation
would at least be improved if an approach were used that employed
the per se rule only to the extent of facilitating prima facie proof of
plaintiff's case. The burden would then fall on the defendant to
show that circumstances justify the use of the particular arrangement. In other words, it should be clear to the courts that the approach is one of "prima fade" illegality rather than "per se" illegality as the latter term is traditionally used in antitrust context.
Susser presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
elucidate several indistinct areas of antitrust law: namely, the applicability and scope of the per se rule in tying arrangements, the
nature of trademarks in antitrust contexts (including the effect of
the Lanham Act in antitrust litigation), and the extent to which the
good will or integrity of the product defense is allowable in a tie-in
situation. If business justification achieves status as a valid defense in an antitrust action, the unique attributes of many trademarks, the proscriptions of the Lanham Act against antitrust illegality, and the general legislative and judicial antipathy toward tieins would seem to dictate the extension of the prima facie illegality
rule to cover tying clauses involving unique trademarks when a
substantial amount of commerce is affected. On the other hand, if
the presumption of illegality is treated as tantamount to a per se
violation as it has been in the patent cases and no business justification defense is permitted, the important element of quality control,
so necessary to a franchise system such as Carvel, will be nearly impossible to maintain.

